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I. INTRODUCTION
For many, the diagnosis of conditions such as Parkinson's disease, di-
abetes, or Alzheimer's disease left them with a feeling of hopelessness
and despair. Recently, experiments have revealed that fetal tissue may
prove to be an invaluable resource in the treatment of these and many
other ailments. The use of fetal tissue, however, presents a number of
ethical and legal questions. Consider the following hypothetical situa-
tions:
A twenty-six year old woman and her family were devastated when
her father was diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease. The man whom they
loved was gradually being reduced to a man who at fifty-two years of age
could barely care for himself. Desperate to stop the heartrending dete-
rioration of the father, the family repeatedly suggested that the woman,
the only female of childbearing age, become pregnant for the sole purpose
of aborting the fetus. The family hoped that the doctors could then trans-
plant the brain tissue of the aborted fetus into the father's brain, thereby
alleviating many of the destructive symptoms of Alzeheimer's disease.'
Meanwhile, an entrepreneur saw fetal tissue harvesting as the place
to make his fortune. He sought to establish a company to broker fetal
tissue. The entrepreneur would solicit healthy women of childbearing age
'See Budiansky, McAuliffe & Goode, The New Rules of Reproduction, U.S.
NEws & WORLD REP., Apr. 18, 1988, at 66. A similar request was made by a
California woman who appeared on Ted Koppel's Nightline when she asked a
medical ethics expert whether she could be artificially inseminated with sperm
from her father, who had been diagnosed as having Alzheimer's disease, and then
abort the fetus so that the brain tissue could be transplanted into her father's
brain. Id.
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to become pregnant and then abort the resulting fetuses at a medically
determined time. The company would pay the women for the fetuses and
would in turn sell the fetuses to persons in need of a transplant at a price
which included a five thousand dollar fee for the company's services. To
meet the evergrowing demand for fetal tissue, the entrepreneur planned
to recruit women from third world countries to supply the aborted fetuses.2
While fetal tissue implants have the potential to offer relief to several
million Americans,3 these two scenarios are examples of the many legal
and ethical issues surrounding the technology. Currently, the use of fetal
tissue is loosely regulated by an assortment of laws, many of which were
enacted before the therapeutic use of fetal tissue was even conceived as
a possibility. At the time many of the regulations governing fetal tissue
use were developed, the primary goal of the regulations was to prevent
the exploitation and sale of aborted fetuses following the Supreme Court's
decision in Roe v. Wade.4 Had current technology been foreseen, different
regulations certainly would have been proposed. 5
The purpose of this note is to examine the various legal and ethical
issues raised by fetal tissue transplantation and to suggest regulations
resolving these issues. Included in this discussion will be an analysis of
possible constitutional challenges to these regulations.
II. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FETAL TISSUE TRANSPLANTATION
In November 1987, Sweden became the world's first nation to announce
that its medical researchers were performing fetal tissue transplants into
humans to treat Parkinson's disease.6 Two months later, a group of Mex-
ican doctors reported on the progress of two patients suffering from Par-
kinson's disease who had received transplants of spontaneously aborted
fetal tissue in September 1987.7 Both patients had shown "no adverse
2 See Engel, Virginia Doctor Plans Company to Arrange Sale of Human Kid-
neys, Washington Post, Sept. 19, 1983, at A9, col. 1 [hereinafter Virginia Doctor].
The growing demand for human body parts did in fact prompt a Virginia doctor,
H. Barry Jacobs, to establish a company to broker human kidneys by arranging
for donors throughout the world to sell one of their kidneys. Id.
I See Thorne, Regulating Commerce in Fetal Tissue, SOCIETY, Nov.-Dec. 1988,
at 61. Scientists estimate that a vast number of American citizens could be helped
by fetal tissue transplants. Among these include: (1) one million Parkinson's
patients; (2) 2.5 - 3 million persons affected with Alzheimer's disease; (3) 25,000
persons suffering from Huntington's disease; (4) 600,000 Type I diabetics; (5)
400,000 stroke victims; and (6) several hundred thousand person who have suf-
fered a spinal cord injury. Id.
1 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The right of privacy, which the Court touna to ne part
of the "liberty" guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, encompassed a wom-
an's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. Id.; see Mahowald, Silver
& Ratcheson, The Ethical Options in Transplanting Fetal Tissue, HASTINGS CENT.
REP., Feb. 1987, at 11 [hereinafter Ethical Options].5 Ethical Options, supra note 4.6 Weiss, Cell Grafts Proceed, Value Uncertain, ScI. NEws, Nov. 28, 1987, at 341.
7In Mexico, Fetal Cells for Parkinson's, Sci NEWS, Jan. 16, 1988, at 40.
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complications from the procedure and had shown an evident objective
improvement in their symptoms."8
Doctors also have reported that experiments have shown many more
uses for fetal tissue. Dr. Barth Green of the University of Miami reported
that in the field of nerve regeneration, the use of fetal tissue implants
can aid in the treatment of the several million Americans suffering from
brain disease, head injury, stroke and paralysis.9 At the University of
Pittsburgh, Raymond Lund has shown that the use of fetal brain cells
may renew connections in the eye thereby expanding the treatment pos-
sibilities for the blind.10 Diabetics are currently being treated with im-
planted preinsulin producing cells from fetal pancreases by Dr. Kevin
Lafferty from the University of Colorado. 1 Dr. Robert Gale of the Uni-
versity of California has reported that fetal liver cells may prove to be
more effective than adult bone marrow transplants, improving the prog-
nosis for patients suffering from radiation sickness or leukemia. 12 Dr.
Gale also stated that fetal tissue could be used to implant a normal set
of genes into fetuses suffering from hemophilia, sickle cell anemia and
Tay-Sachs disease.' 3 Early findings also indicate that fetal tissue implants
may be helpful in treating the nearly three million Americans affected
by Alzheimer's disease. 4
Although alternatives to fetal tissue implants are presently available,
these alternatives have proven to be less successful than fetal tissue
implants. 5 For transplantation purposes, fetal tissue is preferable to
adult tissue for many reasons. "Fetal cells are 'immunologically naive'
during the early stages of pregnancy, they have not yet developed all of
the antigens, or surface proteins, that allow the recipient's immune sys-
tem to identify [the transplanted cells] and reject them."'16 In addition,
the use of fetal tissue eliminates the need for the close genetic match
between donor and recipient which is required with adult tissue. 7 Con-
sld.
9 McAuliffe, Cures from Aborted Fetal Tissue: A Startling Count of Healing,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 3, 1986, at 68.
10 Clark, Gosnell & Hager, Should Medicine Use the Unborn?, NEWSWEEK, Sept.
14, 1987, at 62 [hereinafter Should Medicine].
11 Id. at 63; see also Research Promising; Use of Fetal Tissue Stirs Hot Debate,
L.A. Times, Apr. 16, 1988, at 28, col. 1 [hereinafter Use of Fetal Tissue].
12 Should Medicine, supra note 10, at 62. Dr. Gale used fetal liver cells with
three of the victims he treated after the Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster in the
Soviet Union. Gale had hoped that the cells would generate new bone marrow.
Unfortunately, the patients died from radiation burns before the results could be
determined. Id.
I1 Id. at 63.
14 Thorne, supra note 3, at 61.
11 See Ethical Options, supra note 4, at 10. In the treatment of Parkinson's
disease, adrenal gland tissue taken from the patient and transplanted into the
diseased portion of the brain has proven successful in some cases. However, the
patients soon displayed many of their previous symptoms. Due to the "greater
developmental capacity of fetal tissue," it is unlikely that the use of adrenal tissue
will be as successful. Id.
16 Levine, Help From the Unborn, TIME, Jan. 12, 1987, at 62. In this article,
Dr. Gale explained why doctors prefer to use fetal cells as opposed to adult cells
for transplantation purposes. Id.
17 Waste Not, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 5, 1988, at 100.
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sequently, recipients of fetal tissue no longer require the expensive and
dangerous anti-rejection drugs normally required after a tissue trans-
plant. 8 Unlike adult cells, the fetal cells also have the capacity to re-
generate and adapt to a new environment, thereby stimulating the growth
of new blood vessels and producing the new nerve connections necessary
to repair a damaged brain or spinal cord."
There are numerous factors which are important to the effective trans-
plantation of fetal tissue. The type of abortion procedure employed 20 and
the maturity of the fetus both affect the quality of the tissue.21 Moreover,
the timing of the transplantation is crucial as fetal tissue ceases to func-
tion and develop within several hours after death. 22
It is understandable that there is excitement in the medical field re-
garding the potential of fetal tissue implants in the treatment of various
medical conditions. In fact, it has been stated by one researcher that fetal
tissue implants have "proven to this point to reverse every kind of neu-
rological disorder that has been placed before it."23 With 1.5 million elec-
tive abortions performed each year in the United States,24 there would
appear to be an abundant source of fetal transplant tissue available to
the medical community.25
18 Id.
1 Weiss, Forbidding Fruits of Fetal-Cell Research, Sci. NEws, Nov. 5, 1988, at
296.
20 See Ethical Options, supra note 4, at 13. Hysterotomy is defined as an incision
of the uterus, usually for the delivery of a fetus. This procedure, which is the
riskiest for the pregnant woman, is the least damaging to the fetus and therefore
provides superior tissue. Conversely, dilation and evaluation, which is the most
damaging to the fetus, is the safest method of abortion for the pregnant woman.
Id.
21 See Fine, The Ethics of Fetal Tissue Transplants, HASTINGS CENT. REP., June-
July 1988, at 5. "The ability of neurons to survive transplantation appears to be
greatest if they are taken from the [fetal] brain while still immature, after they
have ceased to divide but before they have begun to grow their long, fibrous axons.
If they are taken at later stages, the inevitable cutting of these axons may be
fatal to the cells.... [If they are taken earlier, while the cells are still dividing,]
the effect of subsequent transplant growth may resemble that of a brain tumor."
Id.
"Ethical Options, supra note 4, at 10.
2Note, Fetal Tissue Implants: An Explosive Technology Needs National Action,
92 DICK. L. REV. 895. 898 (1988) [hereinafter, Note, An Explosive Technology].
"Culliton, Panel Backs Fetal Tissue Research, Sci., Dec. 23,1 988, at 1625.
See Fine, supra note 21, at 6. "In 1981, 78 percent of inducea abortions were
performed between the sixth and eleventh weeks of gestation - that is, at stages
appropriate for neural transplantation. Of these, 94 percent were performed...
by suction curettage .... Cells within these tissue fragments may remain alive
and can be collected aseptically. In approximately one case in ten, the fragment
containing the fetal midbrain can be identified." Id. In light of these facts, ap-
proximately 110,000 appropriately aged fetuses could be used for transplantation.
Id. See also Use of Fetal Tissue, supra note 11, at 28. In addition, the use of aborted
fetuses is being supplemented by tissue grown from the cells of previously aborted
fetuses. Through the use of nutrients and growth enhancers, Hana Biologics, Inc.
has developed a procedure to produce sufficient cells from one fetal pancreas to
treat twenty adult diabetics. Id.
[Vol. 4:1
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Although fetal tissue implants present a number of promising possi-
bilities to the medical research community, such technology also raises
a number of legal and ethical questions. Should a woman be prohibited
from becoming pregnant for the sole purpose of aborting the fetus? If not,
should she be able to sell the fetus she has electively aborted or be able
to designate the recipient of her aborted fetus? Can the medical com-
munity ignore a technology that could dramatically improve so many
lives? Does this technology actually sacrifice one life for the benefit of
another? Who, if anyone, has the right to make these determinations?
III. ABORTION AND THE SUPREME COURT
Since the majority of fetal tissue is obtained from elective abortions,2
the use of fetal tissue is affected by the right of a woman to obtain an
abortion. In the 1973 landmark decision, Roe v. Wade,27 the Supreme
Court held that the constitutional right of privacy gives women the right
to choose an abortion. Although the Court has steadfastly upheld this
basic right since 1973, the seven to two pro-abortion majority in Roe was
narrowed to a five to four majority in the 1986 case, Thornburgh v. Amer-
ican College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,28 which reaffirmed Roe.29
In January, 1989, the Supreme Court reopened the abortion issue when
it agreed to consider Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.30 Webster
involved a Missouri statute which stated that life began at conception
and that public funds could not be used to perform abortions or counsel
women about this procedure. 1 A sharply divided Court held, in Webster,
that states could impose restrictions on a woman's right to an abortion.3 2
While the Court refrained from overruling the Roe decision, it did uphold
provisions of the Missouri law which allowed states to require doctors to
test the ability of a twenty week or older fetus to survive outside the
womb. 33 Many states, including Missouri, criminalized the aborting of a
viable fetus.34 The Court also ruled that states may ban the use of public
facilities and public employees in the abortion procedure. 35 The impact
2 6 Medical Use of Fetal Tissue Spurs New Abortion Debate, N.Y. Times, Aug.
16, 1987, at A30, col. 5 [hereinafter Medical Use]; see also Jaroff, Steps Toward
a Brave New World, TmIE, July 13, 1987, at 57. Doctors worry about the use of
tissue from spontaneously aborted fetuses which often have serious genetic de-
fects. Id.
27 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
476 U.S. 747 (1986).
2 Reappraising Topic A, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 23, 1989, at 10.
- 109 S.Ct. 3040 (1989).
31 Sachs, Abortion on the Ropes, TIME, Dec. 15, 1988, at 58.
32 Court Rules for Limits on Abortion, The Plain Dealer, July 4, 1989, at 1-A,
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of Webster could lead to a reduced number of aborted fetuses available
for fetal tissue implant procedures. 36
Shortly after rendering its decision in Webster, the Court agreed to hear
three more abortion cases during its 1989-90 term.3 Two of these cases
have been decided, one is still pending before the Court. The undecided
case from Illinois, Ragsdale v. Turnock, is the most threatening to the
Roe decision as it involves state laws which enforce stringent regulations
on abortion clinics.3 To uphold the Illinois laws, the Supreme Court would
most likely be forced to "dismantle its 1973 decision. '39 The other two
cases involve the companion issue of whether the parents of a young,
unmarried girl must be notified before she may obtain an abortion.
4 0
The Court's decision in Webster increased the authority of the state to
regulate abortion within its borders. If the Court should overturn Roe v.
Wade and the constitutionally protected right to an abortion, states would
be free "to impose stringent regulations on - or even outlaw - abor-
tion."41 Such a decision would result in abortion laws which would vary
widely from state to state.42
Approximately one dozen liberal states, such as New York, Oregon,
and Hawaii, would probably preserve abortion rights. 43 Conversely, ap-
proximately two dozen state legislatures would probably vote to restrict
or end abortion rights." As a result, the use of fetal tissue from elective
abortions would be limited to those states retaining abortion rights. It
would still be necessary to enact uniform regulations for the use of fetal
tissue in states where abortion rights were retained.
- Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S.Ct. 3040, 3079 (1989) (Black-
mun, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part); see also, Blackmun Feels a
'Chill Wind', The Plain Dealer, July 4, 1989, at 3-A, col. 1. Although women
currently retain the right to an abortion, many believe the Court is simply paving
the way to an outright ban on abortion. Justice Harry Blackmun wrote in his
dissent: "For today, the women of this nation still retain the liberty to control
their destinies. But the signs are evident and very ominous, and a chill wind
blows." Id.
37 Supreme Court Shifts Battleground to States, The Plain Dealer, July 4, 1989,
at 4-A, col. 1. Ragsdale v. Turnock, 841 F.2d 1358 (1988) is still pending before
the U.S. Supreme Court; Ohio v. Akron Center For Reproductive Health, 110
S.Ct. 2972 (1990) and Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S.Ct. 2926 (1990) were decided
in the last 1990 session of the Court.
Court to Ponder Three More Abortion Cases Next Year, The Plain Dealer,
July 4, 1989, at 5-A, col. 5 [hereinafter, Court to Ponder].
Id.
-Akron Center For Reproductive Health, 110 S.Ct. at 2972 (where the Court
held the state statute's bypass provision requiring a physician to effectuate notice
violated due process); Hodgson, 110 S.Ct. at 2926 (where the Court held that the
parental provision, absent a bypass provision, was unconstitutional and the forty-
eight hour notice requirement which forced the minor to notify both parents in
the absence of a judicial waiver was unconstitutional.).
41 Court to Ponder, supra note 38.
42 Court Rules, supra note 32.




IV. CURRENT FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATION OF FETAL TISSUE
A. Federal Regulations
Currently, fetal tissue use is regulated at both the federal and state
level by an assortment of laws. Many of these laws, which regulate organ
and tissue donations, as well as fetal research, were enacted before fetal
tissue implants had become medically feasible. Federal regulations per-
taining to the fetus apply only to research, development and related
activities funded by the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS).46 These regulations specifically state that they will not "in any
way render inapplicable pertinent state or local law."'
The federal regulations make a number of distinctions in restricting
the use of fetuses in research. The current legal restrictions on the use
of fetal tissue are dependant on the manner in which the tissue is cate-
gorized. The first distinction applies to dead fetuses ex utero and live
fetuses ex utero. Federal laws relinquish all regulation of activities in-
volving dead fetuses ex utero47 to state and local governments.4 The fed-
eral regulations which control activities involving live fetuses ex-utero
distinguish between viable and non-viable fetuses. A viable fetus is de-
fined as a fetus which is "able, after either spontaneous or induced de-
livery, to survive (given the benefit of available medical therapy) to the
point of independently maintaining heartbeat and respiration."49 A non-
viable fetus is defined as "a fetus ex utero which, although living, is not
viable."50 If a fetus is found to be even questionably viable, federal reg-
ulations prohibit the use of this fetus for any research which would place
the fetus at risk.51
Research involving a nonviable fetus is permissible when the experi-
mental activity does not prematurely terminate the life of the fetus and
the vital functions of the fetus are not artificially maintained.5 2 This
federal regulation most directly relates to fetal tissue transplantation.
Although tissue from a nonviable fetus has been compared to tissue ob-
tained from a cadaver, there is one important difference - fetal brain
tissue may not be dead.58
4 45 C.F.R. §46.201(a) (1988).
8 45 C.F.R. §46.201(b) (1988).
45 C.F.R. §46.201(f) (1988). "'Dead Fetus' means a fetus ex utero which
exhibits neither heartbeat, spontaneous respiratory activity, spontaneous move-
ment of voluntary muscles, nor pulsation of the umbilical cord (if still attached)."
Id.
41 45 C.F.R. §46.201 (1988).
4945 C.F.R. §46.203(d) (1988).
45 C.F.R. §46.203(e) (1988).
M 45 C.F.R. §46.209(a), (c) (1988).
2 45 C.F.R. §46.209(b) (1988).
53 Ethical Options, supra note 4, at 10.
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If a similar federal regulation were imposed upon fetal tissue trans-
plantation, it could prohibit the use of fetal brain tissue from live non-
viable fetuses ex utero. The procedure required for a successful fetal brain
transplantation could prematurely terminate the nonviable fetus's life.5 4
In addition, a successful fetal tissue implant could require that the vital
functions of the fetus be artificially maintained until the time of the
implant.65
Federal requirements which impact upon fetal tissue use are found not
only in statutes regulating the disposal of fetuses but also in statutes
treating the use of human organs. In October 1984, Congress signed into
law the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA).5 6 One of NOTA's pur-
poses was the prohibition of organ purchases.57 Although the term "or-
gan", as defined in the NOTA does not include tissue,58 Jeremy Rifkin,
President of the Foundation for Economic Trends, has filed a petition with
the HHS asking that all fetal tissue and organs be regulated under
NOTA. 5s
In March 1988, Assistant Secretary of Health, Robert Windom, tem-
porarily banned all HHS funded research using intentionally aborted
fetal tissue.6° The ban was precipitated by researchers' request to the
National Institute of Health (NIH) to fund the first United States implant
of fetal brain cells into a person afflicted with Parkinson's disease.61 Win-
dom instructed the NIH to assemble an advisory panel of experts includ-
ing scientists, religious leaders, lawyers and bioethicists, to examine the
medical, legal and ethical issues associated with fetal tissue use. 2
In December 1988, after five highly emotional meetings, 3 the NIH
panel decided in a seventeen to four vote to ignore the ethical issues
attendant to the abortion issue in order to allow fetal tissue research to
54Id. at 11.
5'Id.
42 U.S.C. §274 (Supp. IV 1986).
42 U.S.C. §274e(a) (Supp. IV 1986). "It shall be unlawful for any person to
knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable
consideration for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate
commerce." Id.
"142 U.S.C. §274e(c) (Supp. IV 1986). 'The term 'human organ' means the
human kidney, liver, heart, lung, pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye bone, and
skin, and any other human organ specified by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services by regulation." Id.
59 Use of Fetal Tissue, supra note 11, at 29, col. 1.
Roberts, Fetal Panel to Meet, Sci., Sept. 2, 1988 at 1164.
61 Weiss, supra note 19, at 296.
62 Id. In a memo to NIH Director James B. Wyngaarden, Windom wrote:
This proposal raises a number of questions - primarily ethical and
legal - that have not been satisfactorily addressed, either within the
Public Health Service or within Society at large .... I am withholding
my approval of the proposed experiment, and future experiments, in





proceed in the United States.6 The panel recommended an end to the
HHS ban on studies using intentionally aborted fetuses, subject to strin-
gent regulations.6 5 Before President Reagan left office, however, an ex-
ecutive order was prepared which banned fetal tissue studies.6 6 While the
order has remained unsigned, it would seem inconsistent with President
Bush's present stand on abortion to lift the ban.6 7
The HHS ban is similar to the federal regulations as it applies only to
federally funded fetal tissue research. However, the NIH regulation's are
used by the many private institutions conducting fetal tissue research as
a model for their own research guidelines." Furthermore, the NIH, which
is viewed as the nation's research leader,69 funded a significant portion
of fetal tissue research in the private sector.7 0
B. State Regulations
At the state level, the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA)71 is the
most widely accepted policy regulating human tissue and organ dona-
tion.7 2 Approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws in 1968, the UAGA had been adopted in some form by
all fifty states and the District of Columbia by 1973.73 Although the UAGA
does not address the issue of fetal tissue implants directly, it does address
the use of organs and tissue from the dead.74
Under the UAGA, a stillborn infant or fetus is included in the definition
of"decedent.'75 Since the UAGA does not differentiate between a stillborn
fetus resulting from a spontaneous abortion and one resulting from an
elective abortion, it appears to relate to tissue donations in either situ-
-Culliton, Fetal Research Morally Acceptable, Sci., Sept. 23, 1988 at 1594.
One concern of the panel was that others would do this research if NIH did not,
and they could possibly perform their research without safeguards and federal
supervision.
Abortion-Related Battles Ahead on Many Fronts, The Plain Dealer, Feb. 26,
1989, at 9-A, col. 1 [hereinafter Abortion-Related Battles].
6Id.
67 Id. "James Bopp, Jr., general counsel to the National Right to Life Committee
and a dissenting member of the NIH advisory panel stated, 'I frankly think lifting
the moratorium would be inconsistent with Bush's views on abortion."' Id.
0 Note, Fetal Tissue Transplants: Restricting Recipient Designation, 39 HAS-
TINGS L. J. 1079, 1087 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Restricting Recipient Designation].
6 Id. at 1086.
o Use of Fetal Tissue, supra note 11, at 28, col. 1. In 1981, fetal cell research
groups received about $11.8 million dollars from the NIH. Id.
71 UAGA (1987), 8A U.L.A. (Supp. 1990). "An Act authorizing the gift of all
or part of a human body after death for specified purposes." Id.
72 Note, Restricting Recipient Designation, supra note 68, at 1088.
73 Spencer, Maximizing Use of a Scarce National Resource: An Analysis of
Alternatives for Establishing Uniform Standards of Conduct for Organ Procure-
ment Agencies, 42 FoOD DRUG COSM. L. J. 430, 440-41 (1987).
74 UAGA §1(1), 8A U.L.A. 7 (Supp. 1990).
7r UAGA §1(2), 8A U.L.A. 7 (Supp. 1990). "'Decedent' means a deceased in-
dividual and includes a stillborn infant or fetus." Id.
1989-901
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ation.76 The UAGA allows either parent of the decedent to "make an
anatomical gift of all or part of the decedent's body for an authorized
purpose," as long as the other parent does not object." Under the UAGA,
the anatomical gift may be made for the purpose of research, transplan-
tation by a hospital, physician or procurement agency, or transplantation
into a designated individual.7
Twenty-five states have no restrictions on fetal research beyond the
UAGA. These states appear to authorize the use of fetal tissue for research
and transplantation. The remaining states, however, have supplemented
and sometimes preempted the UAGA's broad authority with specific reg-
ulation of fetal research. 79 The majority of these states either have adopted
the provisions of the UAGA and allow nontherapeutic research on dead
fetuses, 0 or have modified these provisions only slightly.s' Six states have
absolutely prohibited the use of dead fetuses, and therefore, appear to
prohibit fetal research. 2
The UAGA also contains a provision prohibiting the purchase or sale
of a body part for transplantation or therapy. 3 Since the UAGA does not
specifically address the use of fetal tissue, the question arises as to
whether fetuses should be treated as renewable body tissue that can be
sold or as body organs that cannot be sold.& Examples of the sale of
renewable body tissue are cash payments to donors for such things as
blood, bone marrow and semen. 5 Allowing women to receive payments
for their aborted fetuses, however, provides a possible incentive to inten-
tionally conceive for the sole purpose of selling the aborted fetus. This
conduct would violate the UAGA.
At the time the UAGA and many of the statutes were enacted, fetal
remains were of limited value and use. The use of fetal tissue for brain
or other transplants was not contemplated. With the monumental ad-
vances in fetal tissue technology, the majority of organ and tissue reg-
ulations inadequately address many of the ethical and legal issues
associated with fetal tissue implants. For example, under current UAGA
provisions a woman can designate the recipient of her aborted fetus.8 6
76 Restricting Recipient Designation, supra note 68, at 1089.
77 UAGA §3(a)(3), (b)(3), 8A U.L.A. 13 (Supp. 1990).
78 UAGA §6(a), 8A U.L.A. 21 (Supp. 1990).
79 UAGA, 8A U.L.A. 4 (Supp. 1990) (general statutory notes).
o See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. § 436.026 (Baldwin 1989).
SI See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-436 to -441 (Supp. 1989).
82 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.14(a) (Anderson 1989).
s3 UAGA § 10(a), 8A U.L.A. 25 (Supp. 1990).
84 Medical Use, supra note 26, at 30. Professor Taub of Rutgers University
stated, "It's a hard one, whether fetuses should be treated as renewable body
tissue that can be sold or as organs that can't be. I don't think fetal tissue should
be saleable." Id.
85 Best, Transfers of Bodies and Body Parts Under the UAGA. 15 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 806, 821 (1980); see also Murray, On the Human Body as Property:
The Meaning of Embodiment, Markets and the Meaning of Strangers, 20 J. L.
REFORM 1055, 1074 (1987). "We do not view all trade in body parts with the same
seriousness, e.g., hair nailclippings, plasma and semen .... It is clear some mar-
kets in body products are to be tolerated." Id.
" UAGA § 6(a)(3), 8A U.L.A. 21 (Supp. 1990).
[Vol. 4:1
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While not violative of the UAGA's prohibition against a sale of body parts,
this right provides an additional incentive to conceive for the sole purpose
of aborting the fetus to help a loved one, a friend, or even herself. As
Arthur Caplan, the Director of the Center for Biomedical Ethics at the
University of Minnesota, stated, "[t]he worst possible ethical evil of all
this would be to create lives simply to end them and take the parts."17
As the possibilities for fetal tissue implants continue to grow, so too do
the ethical and legal issues related to their use. Often the laws of society
lag behind scientific breakthroughs and the burgeoning or unresolved
ethical and legal issues that directly result from technological advances s8s
Currently, the states are attempting to regulate fetal tissue use by adapt-
ing organ and tissue statutes enacted prior to the therapeutic use of fetal
tissue. Since fetal tissue research has the possibility of affecting millions
of Americans, its import and force within the medical community has
prompted a need for legislation that directly regulates fetal tissue use.
One way of accomplishing uniform state regulation of fetal tissue use is
to amend the UAGA. Since the UAGA has already been enacted in some
form by all fifty states, it would be an appropriate forum for setting forth
the uniform regulation of fetal tissue use. 9
V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Since any regulation of the disposition of fetal remains impacts a wom-
an's reproductive decisions, one must be mindful of the constitutional
right of privacy when attempting to regulate any aspect of fetal tissue
use. The "freedom to care for one's health and person [free] from bodily
restraint or compulsion"'9 is one of the most basic elements of the right
of privacy.9' The Supreme Court has long held that the "right to be let
alone.. . [is] the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued
by civilized man".92 The Court has found this right to be of particular
importance when the contemplated state intervention involves a physical
intrusion on a person's body.93 "No right is held more sacred, or is more
carefully guarded ... than the right of every individual to the possession
and control of his own person. ' '94
87 Should Medicine, supra note 10, at 63.
The Flesh Peddlers, THE PROGRESSIVE, Oct. 1987, at 9.
'9 Although the effectiveness of such an amendment rests upon all of the states
enacting similar legislation, a uniform regulation which directly controls the use
of fetal tissue is an appropriate starting point.
Io Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 213 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
91 Such, Lifesaving Medical Treatment for the Nonviable Fetus: Limitations of
State Authority Under Roe v. Wade, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 961, 970 (1986).
92 Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
93 Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional
Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L. J. 577, 617 (1986)
[hereinafter Note, Creation of Fetal Rights].
94 Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
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The constitutional "Right of Privacy" was first articulated by the Court
in the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut.95 In Griswold,6 the Supreme
Court struck down a Connecticut statute which had forbidden the use of
contraceptives by married couples as violative of the plaintiff's consti-
tutional right of privacy. Although the right of privacy is not expressly
enumerated in the Constitution, Justice Douglas stated in the majority
opinion of the Court that the right existed in "the penumbra" of various
amendments of the Bill of Rights when taken together. 7 The Court held
that the specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras which
establish a general zone in which "privacy is protected from governmental
intrusion."98 Since this general right of privacy evolves from specific fun-
damental rights, it becomes fundamental and, therefore, any infringe-
ment of this right requires strict scrutiny.99
Relying on Griswold, the Court in Eisenstadt v. Baird,100 struck down
a Massachusetts statute which permitted contraceptives to be distributed
only by registered pharmacists and only to married couples. The Court
held that "if the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child."''
In 1973 the right of privacy, which the Court had found to exist in
Griswold, was extended to the abortion context in Roe v. Wade.'02 In Roe,
Justice Blackmun discussed the zone of privacy and stated: "[T]he Con-
stitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In a line of
decisions, however ... the Court has recognized that a right of personal
privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy does exist
under the Constitution."10 3 The Court held'that the right of privacy rec-
ognized in prior cases was "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."' 4 In fact, the Court held
that a woman's decision as to whether or not to terminate a pregnancy
was a fundamental one which could only be outweighed by a compelling
state interest warranting the restriction of abortions. 10 5 The Court, in a
long line of decisions, has continued to affirm as constitutional the "right
of personal privacy ... [at] the very heart [of which lies] the decision
whether or not to beget or bear a child."'' 1
The Supreme Court's most comprehensive attempt at a generalized
discussion of the right of privacy came in Whalen v. Roe.10 7 Justice Ste-
T Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 1410, 1421 (1974).
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
97Id.
- Id.
Henkin, supra note 95, at 1421.
100 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
101 Id. at 453 (Emphasis in the original).
1-2 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
103 Id. at 152.
104 Id. at 153.
o10 Id. at 155.
10- Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (right to use
contraceptives).1- 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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vens, writing for a unanimous Court, suggested that the right of privacy
embraced a general interest beyond the least common denominator of
marital choice, procreation or contraception found in the Court's prior
decisions. 10 8 The Court observed that privacy cases involve at least two
different types of interests: (1) a general "individual interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters" (as in Griswold) and (2) a general "interest
in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions" (as in
Roe v. Wade).1 9
"Because the Court has emphasized that the right of privacy is the
right to make decisions free from state intrusion, not only is the state
prohibited from infringing directly on the protected right, but it also may
not act in any way to interfere with the individual's decisionmaking
autonomy."" 0 Any state statute which infringes upon the right of privacy
will be subjected to strict scrutiny. The statute must not only promote a
compelling state interest but must also be narrowly drawn so that it
fulfills only the legitimate state interest.1 '
VI. PROPOSED LEGISLATION FOR FETAL TISSUE USE
Because the source of the majority of fetal tissue is intentionally aborted
fetuses," 2 the ethical implications of fetal tissue use remain controversial.
Right-to-life groups fear that finding a positive use for fetal tissue may
help legitimize abortion. 13 These groups argue that "a woman's decision
to abort creates an adversarial relationship between a mother and her
fetus and calls into question her moral right to donate the aborted tissues
to science."' 4
Medical researchers and others, however, argue that while fetal tissue
use should be regulated, there is no reason to waste such an invaluable
resource which is procured from a constitutionally protected procedure. '1
Many of the proponents for fetal tissue research agree with New York
University biology professor, Efrain Azmitia, who stated: "[I]f society
condones abortion and if tissue from the destroyed fetus could help some-
one dying from Parkinson's or some other terrible disease, then I think
'
08 Id. at 591.
1o Id. at 592.
110 See Creation of Fetal Rights, supra note 91, at 618.
"I Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). A regulation limiting a fundamental
right may be justified only by a compelling state interest. Id.
112 See Waste Not, supra note 17, at 100.
1, See Medical Use, supra note 26.
114 Weiss, Panel Recommends Resuming Fetal Studies, Sci. NEWS, Sept. 24,
1988, at 197.
15 See Weiss, supra note 19. Robin Duke, Co-Chairman of the Population Crisis
Committee in New York City stated: "To hold hostage a nation and medical
research for a minority group who are anti-abortion is to my mind a very grave
mistake." Id.
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it is immoral to throw that tissue down the drain.""' 6
As a result of the wide disparity of beliefs on the use of fetal tissue,
there have been cries for regulation which range from a total ban on fetal
tissue use to a lax system of regulation. It is argued that a lax system
would allow for the freedom of intellectual thought necessary for scientific
advancement. In the following sections, this note will analyze alternatives
for amending the UAGA which in turn will influence the state regulation
of fetal tissue use.
A. Total Ban on Use of Intentionally Aborted Fetuses
When the HHS temporarily banned experiments using intentionally
aborted fetal tissue in March, 1988, it allowed experiments using fetal
tissue from spontaneous abortions and stillbirths to continue. 117 The HHS
halted research on fetal tissue transplantation pending the recommen-
dations of the NIH panel which was created to examine the legal and
ethical issues associated with fetal tissue use."8 Prior to the release of
the panel's report, however, the Reagan administration drafted an ex-
ecutive order stating that it should be government policy that "an unborn
or newborn child who has died as a result of an induced abortion shall
not be used for purposes of research or transplantation."1 9 As stated
earlier, President Reagan did not sign the order prior to leaving office,
but it is still possible that President Bush may sign the order into effect.
Following the lead of the executive order, many states also may decide
to address the issue of fetal tissue use by banning all use of fetal tissue
obtained from elective abortions. Such a ban would eliminate many of
the ethical issues associated with the use of fetal tissue obtained from
elective abortions. This ban would alleviate the fears of many anti-abor-
tion and pro-choice activists alike. 20 Such a ban, however, would create
two distinct groups of women with fetal remains: (1) those women who
had spontaneous abortions or stillborn fetuses and who are permitted to
donate their fetuses to science; and (2) those women who had elective
abortions and who are prohibited from donating their fetuses to science.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o State shall make or
enforce any law which shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
116 See McAuliffe, supra note 9, at 69; see also Culliton, supra note 24, at 1626.
John Robertson, Professor of Law at the University of Texas stated: "One could
reasonably argue that it would be unethical to discard this tissue rather than
use it in research that could save many lives:" Id.; see also Culliton, Fetal Research
Morally Acceptable, Sci., Sept. 23, 1988, at 1593. Some members of the NIH
advisory panel stated that researchers have an ethical duty to conduct studies
with fetal tissue for the benefit of mankind. Id.
'"See Roberts, supra note 59.
Embryonic Questions, Sci. AM., Dec. 1988, at 27.
119 Id.
120 See Thorne, supra note 3. Some pro-choice believers oppose fetal tissue use
because they fear the exploitation of those women who will easily be coerced or
willing to lease their wombs solely for the purpose of producing fetal tissue; see
also supra notes 113 and 114 and accompanying text.
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the equal protection of the laws."'' In applying this clause:
[The Supreme] Court has consistently recognized that the Four-
teenth Amendment does not deny to States the power to treat
different classes of persons in different ways. The Equal Pro-
tection Clause of that Amendment does, however, deny the
States the power to legislate that different treatment be ac-
corded to persons placed by statute into classes on the basis of
criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute. A
classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.
1 22
In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Supreme Court invalidated a Massachusetts
statute which permitted contraceptives distribution only by registered
physicians and pharmacists and only to married persons. 123 The Court
found that the statute thereby discriminated against the unmarried and
violated the rights of single persons under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 124 The Court noted that "[wihatever the
rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the rights
must be the same for the unmarried and married alike.' ' 25
A state's enactment of a ban similar to the one proposed by the Reagan
administration might violate the rights of women who engaged in eledtive
abortions under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that a woman's interest
in deciding whether or not to terminate a pregnancy was a fundamental
one.126 A statute which would allow women who had spontaneous abor-
tions or stillborn fetuses to donate the fetal remains to science, but which
would prohibit women who had elective abortions from doing so, could
punish a woman for engaging in her fundamental right to decide whether
or not to terminate her pregnancy. Such a prohibition could place an
impermissible burden upon a woman's decision.
For example, an impermissible burden was found by the district court
in a Louisiana statute which required a physician to tell a woman who
had an abortion that she must choose between burial or other means of
disposal. 127 The Court held:
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
122 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971) (Citations omitted).
"- 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
124 Id.
12' Id. at 453.
126 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
121 Id. at 670; Margaret S. v. Treen, 597 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. La. 1984), af d on
other grounds sub nom.
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The woman's right to privacy encompasses the entire process
surrounding the abortion ... By requiring the physician to
confront the woman with a choice on the method of disposal,
the state suggests to the woman that it equates abortion with
the taking of a human life. Such a suggestion can only serve
to increase the woman's feelings of guilt and impose a psycho-
logical burden on her. This requirement thus penalizes those
women who exercise their constitutional right in choosing abor-
tion."12
As in Eisenstadt,129 it would appear that the rights of women who had
spontaneous abortions should be the same as the rights of women who
had elective abortions. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits states from
legislating in such a way that "different treatment be accorded to persons
placed by statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly
unrelated to the objective of that statute."'130
A regulation which accords different treatment to women who had
spontaneous abortions and women who had elective abortions is not ra-
tionally related to a legislative purpose unless it advances a substantial
state goal. Any such regulation must be narrowly tailored to serve the
purposes for which it was enacted. Arguably a state can advance several
substantial interests in prohibiting the use of electively aborted fetuses.
A state may have an interest in preventing the exploitation of women
who may be coerced into "leasing" their uteruses for the production of
fetal tissue. Furthermore, the state may have an interest in protecting
women from the dangerous physical and psychological effects of needless
abortions. A state may also have an interest in ensuring an ethical prac-
tice regarding elective abortions by discouraging the practice of women
who intentionally become pregnant for the sole purpose of aborting the
fetus. In addition, the state may have an interest in protecting the quality
of fetal tissue available to donees.' 31 The state may also have an interest
in protecting against the exploitation of the fetus and the reproductive
process as a whole.
When taken individually and as a whole, each of these state interests
is substantial. However, it is important that any regulation be narrowly
tailored to serve the purposes for which it was enacted. A flat ban on the
use of electively aborted fetuses sweeps too broadly. Such a ban would
also prohibit women who have abortions after an unplanned pregnancy
from donating the aborted fetuses to science. 3 2 This flat ban would not
'
2SId. at 670.
- Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S 438,453 (1972). The Court held that "the rights
must be the same for the unmarried and the married alike."
130 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. at 71, 75 (1971).
131 See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
132 See Lawton, Fetal Tissue Transplants Stir Controversy, CISTIANITY TODAY,
Mar. 18, 1988, at 52. When researchers instructed floor nurses to ask women
scheduled for abortions whether they would allow researchers to use the fetal
tissue to help others, 92 percent of the women asked agreed, saying it would
enable some good to come out of their abortion decision. Id.
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be narrowly drawn to express the state's interest. In contrast, a narrowly
drawn regulation that prohibits the sale of fetal tissue or recipient des-
ignation would better serve the state's interest without treading upon
important personal rights.
B. Prohibiting the Sale of Fetal Tissue
Much of the uneasiness associated with fetal tissue use is caused by
the thought that women might intentionally become pregnant for the
sole purpose of aborting the fetus."'3 It would be difficult, if not impossible,
to legislate against such a practice. 13 4 It is possible, however, to enact
legislation which would eliminate the incentive for women to engage in
such a practice.
One of the incentives to abort comes from monetary inducement. Anti-
abortion activists argue that if the sale of fetal tissue is permitted, the
result will be an "increased number of abortions, changes in abortion
procedures, and delayed abortions to facilitate acquisition of more useful
fetal tissue."135 Pro-choice activists fear that the sale of fetal tissue will
result in the exploitation of women because they will be pressured "by
economic need to become fetal factories." 13 6 Civil rights activists worry
that the sale of fetal tissue will exploit the poor for the benefit of the
rich. 13 7 Ethicists state that if the sale of fetal tissue is permitted "our
society will have taken one more plunge into the moral gutter."'' 38
Any incentive to abort for monetary gain could be eliminated by an
amendment to the UAGA that would specifically prohibit the sale or
purchase of any fetal remains. Such a ban should provide in pertinent
part:
It shall be unlawful for any person to sell, to offer to sell, to
buy, to offer to buy, or to procure through purchase any fetal
remains, whether as the result of elective abortions, sponta-
neous abortions, or stillbirths, for any reason, including, but
not limited to, medical and scientific uses such as transplan-
tation, implantation, infusion or injection. 3 9
133 See Medical Use, supra note 26. One neurosurgeon stated: "There is a big
difference between taking advantage of a death to harvest tissue and creating a
life just to abort it." Id.
1 See Fine, supra note 21, at 7. While successful therapeutic use of fetal tissue
might influence a woman's decision to abort "it is impractical to ascertain motives,
and it would be improvident to legislate against them." Id.
1s See Weiss, supra note 19, at 297. This statement was made by James Bopp,
an Indiana attorney and anti-abortion activist who served on the NIH advisory
panel. Id.
136Gorman, A Balancing Act of Life and Death, TIME, Feb. 1, 1988, at 49. This
statement was made by feminist author Genea Conear; see also supra note 120
and accompanying text.
137 See Virginia Doctor, supra note 2. The selling of body parts raises a number
of ethical questions which include making transplant operations accessible only
to the wealthy and relying on poor donors for organs. Id.
138 The Flesh Peddlers, supra note 88, at 10.
139 Part of this text was taken from VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-289 (1985) which
banned the sale of human organs and adopted a specific ban on the sale of fetal
tissue.
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Such a ban, however, has constitutional implications. As discussed ear-
lier, the constitutional right of privacy protects a person's right to make
certain decisions free from state intrusion, particularly where the decision
involves the integrity of one's own body. However, unlike the right of
privacy situations discussed earlier, a ban on the sale of fetal tissue
involves not only a fundamental privacy right but also an economic right.
Because the decision to sell fetal tissue involves a hybrid of economic and
fundamental rights, any legislation which affects this decision is subject
to an intermediate standard of review.140 Therefore, any legislation en-
acted by the state must be substantially related to achieving an "impor-
tant" state objective (as opposed to the "compelling" state interest
required in strict scrutiny situations).14 '
With respect to the proposed ban, a state has a substantial interest in
prohibiting the sale of fetal tissue.142 First, the state has an interest in
protecting both the physical and emotional well-being of women who may
be pressured into having abortions for monetary gain. Although the ten
minute procedure is carried out more than four thousand times each day,
abortions cannot be described as routine. 143 The procedure itself is painful
as it is usually performed on a patient who has received only a mild
sedative.'" While the procedure is fairly safe, it can result in everything
from a mild infection, to sterility, or even death. In addition, studies have
shown that some women suffer a type of post-abortive mental breakdown
as a result of induced abortions.
145
Second, the state has an interest in protecting women, especially the
poor, from being exploited by material incentives to abort. Poor or des-
perate women might be pressured into conceiving and aborting to pay
bills, support drug habits, or simply for greed. In the past, the government
has intervened to prevent the exploitation of individuals by material
incentives in other areas involving the sale of humans or human tissue.
For example, the Court has held that an individual may not sell himself
into slavery. For much of the same moral revulsion as is associated with
the latter, legislation prohibits the sale of babies for profit. In addition,
Congress, through the NOTA, has prohibited the buying and selling of
human organs.
- See Pyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). When economic legislation treads
upon a personal right, the state must show that the statute furthers a substantial
state interest and does not unnecessarily interfere with personal rights. Id.
141 Id.
142 Many of the state objectives are similar to those discussed during the hear-
ings before the House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment. National
Organ Transplant Act: Hearings on H.R. 4080 Before the Subcomm. on Health
and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 90 (1983).
Weiss, supra note 19.
Telephone interview with an anonymous abortion clinic counselor. (Feb. 15,
1989).
141 D. MALL & W. WATTS, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF ABORTION (1979).
As these studies looked at women who had undergone abortions as the result of
unplanned pregnancies, it could reasonably be hypothesized that intentional preg-




Third, the state has an interest in protecting the well-being of potential
fetal tissue recipients. There is a legitimate fear that purchased fetal
tissue may be of a lower quality than donated fetal tissue. 146 Often the
poorest or most desperate members of society are more likely to conceive
and abort for profit.147 Since these women are often unable to afford suf-
ficient health care and nutrition, purchased fetal tissue could be of a
lesser quality than tissue donated by the general public. 14
Fourth, the state has an interest in discouraging the distribution of
fetal tissue which turns upon a recipient's ability to pay. Purchased fetal
tissue would go to the highest bidder instead of to the individual who
most needs the transplant to survive."49 The sale of fetal tissue would
result in transplant operations being available only to the rich who in
turn would rely on fetal tissue from the poor.1 50 A society where the poor
are the suppliers of fetal tissue and the rich are the beneficiaries "chal-
lenge[s] a very important concept of equality in the United States." ''
Finally, the state has an interest in the impact of fetal tissue sales on
society in general. As Nancy Neveloff Dubler, Director of the Division of
Legal and Ethical Issues in Health Care at Montefiore Medical Center,
stated: "We would not want to live in a society where women become
pregnant for the purpose of making money."15 2 "The buying and selling
of human flesh and the dehumanized uses of the human body ought not
to be encouraged."'' Society's aversion to the buying and selling of human
flesh is evidenced by its reaction to surrogate mother contracts. Subse-
quent to the Baby M case and its bitter battle between an infertile couple
and the surrogate mother with whom they contracted to bear the hus-
band's child, dozen of States have been wrestling with the surrogacy
issue.' T ' The Michigan legislature went so far as to make it a crime to
arrange a contract with a surrogate mother.55
Dr. Arthur Caplan"56 spoke of the "Orwellian possibilities" associated
with fetal tissue sales when he stated:
- See Note, The Sale of Human Organs: Implicating a Privacy Right, 21 VAL.
U. L. REv. 741, 748, n.54 (1987) [hereinafter The Sale of Human Organs]. Con-
gressman Albert Gore noted that blood received by the Red Cross from commercial
sales was of a poorer quality than donated blood." Id.; see also Ethics in Embryo,
HARPER'S MAG., Sept. 1987, at 39. "[T]o maintain the highest quality blood supply
it [is] unwise to have people sell their blood. The profit motive encourages blood
donations from hepatitis carriers." Id.
147 The Sale of Human Organs, supra note 146.
1
4
8 Id. at 748-49.
1
49 Id. at 748.
150 See Virginia Doctor, supra note 2 and text accompanying note 135.
15r Murray, supra note 85, at 1079-80.
1512 Ethics in Embryo, supra note 146, at 38.
153 Murray, supra note 85, at 1073. This statement was made by physician and
philosopher Leon Kass. Id.
" Surrogate Mother Contracts: Consensus May Be Emerging on Their Legality,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1988, at 12, col. 1.
155 Id.
I-" Arthur Caplan is the Director of the Center for Biomedical Ethics at the
University of Minnesota.
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It doesn't take a whole lot of imagination to put yourself in the
situation of the third world where people could go around of-
fering ten cents, five cents, to women to serve as fetal farms
for tissue donation. I don't think that's a practice that we want
to be encouraging. I think part of the objection here, the ethics
concern, is that whatever we're doing between mothers and
fetuses, we don't want them thinking of fetuses as a thing, an
entity, a piece of property simply to chop up and parse out to
whoever happens to have a need or to whoever happens to want
to pay for it.167
These statements express some of the negative impact that the sale of
fetal tissues would have upon society and the interest the state may have
in their ban.
Although the proposed ban on the sale of fetal tissue will also include
women who have not intentionally become pregnant, the state has a
legitimate interest in removing monetary incentives to have an abor-
tion.15 Such incentives may occur where a woman has an unplanned
pregnancy and is unsure about having an abortion but is swayed by the
fact that she can sell the aborted fetus.15 9
Although the proposed ban on the sale of fetal tissue infringes upon a
woman's right to decide what will happen to her body, this right is out-
weighed by the state's interest in removing incentives to abort for mon-
etary gain. Such a ban furthers a substantial state interest and does not
necessarily interfere with a woman's personal right. The ban does not
interfere with a woman's decision to have an abortion, nor does it interfere
with her decision to donate the aborted fetus to science.
C. Prohibiting Recipient Designation of Fetal Tissue
Currently under the UAGA, a woman can designate the recipient of
her aborted fetus.-6" However, when drafting these regulations the draf-
ters of the UAGA were addressing the issue of organ donation rather
than the specific issues associated with fetal tissue use. The donation of
fetal tissue is different from organ donation since conception for the sole
purpose of using the aborted fetus is not an act to be supported. 161 Pro-
hibiting the sale of fetal tissue does not remove all of the incentives for
a woman to conceive to abort. Another troubling problem exists where a
woman aborts for the purpose of donating the fetus to help a relative,
friend or even herself.
See An Explosive Technology, supra note 23, at 914-15.
See Restricting Recipient Designation, supra note 67, at 1106.
159 Id.
'6 UAGA §§ 3(a)(3), 8A U.L.A. 13 (Supp. 1990).
18, See An Explosive Technology, supra note 23, at 915.
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To eliminate any incentive for a woman to conceive in order to abort,
amendments to the UAGA regulating fetal tissue use should include not
only a ban on the sale of fetal tissue but also a ban on recipient designation
of fetal tissue. Such a ban could be achieved by drafting a provision which
specifically regulates the persons who could become donees of fetal tissue.
This amendment should provide in pertinent part:
(a) The following persons may become donees of fetal tissue, whether
from elective abortions, spontaneous abortions or stillbirths, for the
purposes stated:
(1) A hospital, physician, surgeon or procurement organization for
transplantation, therapy, medical evaluation, research or ad-
vancement of medical science; or
(2) An accredited medical school, college or university for educa-
tion, research, advancement of medical science.
(b) A donation of fetal tissue may not be made to a designated indi-
vidual for transplantation or therapy needed by that individual.162
Arguably, a ban on recipient designation will interfere with the right
of privacy concerning reproductive autonomy. Although the rights of abor-
tion, contraception and fetal research are not themselves fundamental,
they are protected when "essential to [the] exercise of the constitutionally
protected right of decision in matters of childbearing that is the under-
lying foundation of the holdings in Griswold, Eisenstadt v. Baird, and
Roe v. Wade.' 16 Hence, the question arises as to whether the right to
designate the recipient of fetal tissue is "essential to [the] exercise of the
constitutionally protected right of decision in matters of childbearing."'1
The Supreme Court's decisions addressing reproductive autonomy have
focused on a woman's decision of whether or not to have a family.165
Recipient designation permits a woman to decide for whom the fetal
remains will be used to help. 66 The decision of whether to have a family
involves a totally different issue because in this case a woman is still
able to abort the fetus or carry it to term. 67 However, while a ban on
recipient designation does not directly infringe upon the childbearing
decision, it does restrict a woman's right to dispose of the fetal remains.'"
The courts have invalidated statutes which limit a woman's access to
fetal tissue when such access could inform or benefit a woman in her
162 Part of this text was taken from UAGA § 6, 8A U.L.A. 21 (Supp. 1990),
which lists who may become donees of anatomical gifts and is adapted to include
who may become donees of fetal tissue.
16 Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688-89 (1977).
16 4 Id.
16 Restricting Recipient Designation, supra note 68, at 1099. See, e.g., Carey
v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (birth control); see, e.g., Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); see, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
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decision about future pregnancies. 69 Unlike access to some forms of fetal
research, however, recipient designation neither informs nor benefits a
woman in her decision about future pregnancies. 170
The courts have also struck down as unconstitutional a number of fetal
disposal statutes which were deemed enacted to psychologically punish
a woman for exercising her legal right to an abortion. 171 A ban on recipient
designation, however, does not punish a woman for exercising her right
to an abortion. Such a ban only removes an incentive to abort.
A ban on recipient designation does not directly interfere with child-
bearing decisions since a woman is still free to abort the fetus or carry
it to term. Such a ban, therefore, does not implicate or unduly burden a
constitutional right. To survive a constitutional challenge, any regulation
banning recipient designation need only be rationally related to a legit-
imate state interest.172
A state does have a legitimate interest in banning recipient designation
of fetal tissue. First, the state has an interest in protecting a woman from
being pressured into having an abortion. A ban on recipient designation
removes any family pressure on a woman to conceive and consequently
abort in order to donate the fetus to a sick family member.1 73 In addition,
unlike other organ transplants, fetal tissue implants are less likely to be
rejected.17 4 This fact expands the number of possible recipients who would
pressure a woman to abort to donate the resulting fetal tissue. Since an
exact tissue match is not necessary for a successful fetal tissue implant,
restricting recipient designation would not greatly reduce the success of
a donee's implant.176
Second, the state has an interest in preventing the exploitation of the
fetus. Although a woman has the right to decide to abort the fetus or
carry it to term, she does not have an unbridled right to use her repro-
ductive system to produce a tissue mass to help a specified recipient. The
right to conceive solely to abort and donate the fetal tissue to a specified
recipient degrades the entire reproductive process and trivializes human
life.176
19 See Margaret S. v. Treen, 597 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. La. 1984) affd on other
grounds sub nom. Statute which prohibited nontherapeutic research on any dead
or live fetus was found to unduly burden a woman's reproductive rights. By
depriving a woman of information concerning fetal deformities in future preg-
nancies, a woman was denied the opportunity to make informed decisions as to
whether to have children at a later date. Id.
170 See Restricting Recipient Designation, supra note 67, at 1100.
171 See Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181 (1980).
172 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 994-96 (1978). Rationality is
tested by the regulations ability to meet a legitimate public purpose. Id.173 The possibility of this type of pressure is exemplified in the hypothesis used
in the introduction of this note.
7I See Ethical Options, supra note 4, at 10.
175 See An Explosive Technology, supra note 23, at 915. Organ transplants, on
the other hand, require a very close tissue match to be successful. Id.
176 See Weiss, supra note 19, at 298. The National Right to Life Committee
wrote in its comments to the NIH panel: "The unborn will be further dehumanized
not only as an expendable inconvenience, but now also as a mere source of benefit
to others through the use of his or her parts." Id.
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Like the ban on the sale of fetal tissue, a ban on recipient designation
will also affect women who have not intentionally become pregnant to
abort. As with the ban on the sale of fetal tissue, the state has an interest
in removing any incentives to abort. The need for fetal tissue could arise
after a woman has become pregnant. Therefore, a sick relative or friend
could pressure her to abort. As attorney and right-to-life activist James
Bopp argues, "[y]ou could provide a noble reason to have an abortion. 177
Although the proposed ban on recipient designation minimally inter-
feres with a woman's right of reproductive choice, this right is outweighed
by the state's legitimate interest in removing any incentives to abort.
Such a ban furthers a legitimate state interest and does not unnecessarily
interfere with a woman's right of reproductive choice. The right to des-
ignate the recipient of fetal tissue is not essential to a woman's right of
reproductive autonomy. A ban on recipient designation neither interferes
with a woman's decision to have an abortion, nor punishes her for making
that decision. In addition, such a ban does not interfere with a woman's
decision to donate the aborted fetus to science.
D. Other Regulations of Fetal Tissue Use
While regulations banning the sale of fetal tissue and recipient des-
ignation will eliminate the incentive to conceive to abort, additional re-
quirements are needed to address other ethical issues associated with
fetal tissue use. One requirement recommended by the NIH advisory
panel on fetal tissue use is that a woman must give her fully informed
consent to any use of fetal tissue taken from her aborted fetus.178 That
the aborted fetus could be used against the woman's wishes or without
her knowledge may result in an impermissible and coercive burden upon
her decision to have an abortion. 179 Also, there must be procedures in
place which separate a woman's decision to have an abortion from her
consent to donate any fetal tissue from her aborted fetus. 180 Securing
informed consent for the use of the fetal tissue, in addition to providing
information about donating fetal tissue, should be delayed until after a
woman has made the decision to abort.8 1
Just as the decision to abort must be separated from the decision to
donate fetal tissue, so too must the doctors who perform the abortion be
separated from the doctors who use the fetal tissue. The presence of
independent physicians would prevent any manipulation of the method
or timing of the abortion. 8 2 To allow otherwise would result in women
prolonging abortions until a fetus has developed to a more suitable age
for transplantation' 83 and undertaking alternative, riskier abortion pro-
177 Embryonic Questions, supra note 118, at 30.
178 Id.
179See An Explosive Technology, supra note 23, at 914.
180 Culliton, supra note 24.
Ill Embryonic Questions, supra note 118, at 30.
182 Fine, supra note 21, at 7.
183 Id. "Prolonging pregnancy differs from maintaining the vital functions of a
cadaver doner [since] the fetus will ... continue developing, perhaps to a stage
where it may feel pain." Id.
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cedures that are less damaging to the fetus.1-
Procedures should also be developed which inform a fetal tissue recip-
ient about the source from which the tissue was obtained. An elective
abortion is a controversial and emotionally charged topic with many
vehement opponents. 185 Therefore, a recipient should be informed that
the fetal cells designated for his use have been procured from an elective
abortion.186
Finally, measures should be taken to prevent the exploitation of the
research and procedure of fetal tissue implants itself. Ethicists recom-
mend that the use of fetal tissue should be limited to reputable medical
centers known for their fetal tissue research. 187 Such a limitation would
help discourage the exploitation of desperately ill patients and their fam-
ilies by unethical doctors promising "miracle" cures from fetal tissue.188
VII. CONCLUSION
Fetal tissue implants have the potential to help several million people.
Scientists believe fetal tissue will be able to offer relief for a variety of
afflictions ranging from Parkinson's disease to AIDS, to paralysis and to
blindness. A treatment for any one of these afflictions would be of mon-
umental significance.
This scientific breakthrough, however, does not come without ethical
and legal dilemmas and repercussions. Presently, fetal tissue use is
loosely and inadequately regulated by an array of laws, many of which
were enacted before the therapeutic use of fetal tissue even came into
existence. As a result, many of the current state and federal laws do not
sufficiently address or eliminate the issues associated with fetal tissue
use. To allow fetal tissue use to continue to develop without humane
guidelines and principles specifically drafted for its use could lead to the
exploitation of women, fetuses, and the whole human reproductive proc-
ess.
This note suggests that the UAGA be amended to specifically address
the use of fetal tissue. A complete ban on the use of tissue from electively
aborted fetuses, as suggested by the Reagan administration, may violate
the rights of women who have engaged in elective abortions under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Other require-
ments, however, may be enacted which do not unnecessarily interfere
with a woman's reproductive autonomy. To eliminate any incentive for a
I" Id. There is no justification for exposing a pregnant woman to riskier pro-
cedures simply to obtain transplantable tissue. Id.
1'5 See The Flesh Peddlers, supra note 88, at 9. Cardinal O'Connor, Catholic
Archbishop of New York stated: "My father was in bed with a nerve disease for
five years. If I had said to him that I would put a baby to death to keep him alive,
he would have put me in jail." Id.
16 Note, An Explosive Technology, supra note 23, at 901.




woman to conceive to abort, amendments to the UAGA regulating fetal
tissue use should include both a ban on the sale of fetal tissue and a ban
on abandoning recipient designation. Additional requirements, including
the informed consent of a woman to donate the fetus and a district sep-
aration of doctors who perform the abortions and doctors who use fetal
tissue, are needed to meet the other ethical issues associated with fetal
tissue use.
"A society that would throw fetal remains into a dumpster or an in-
cinerator without offering them to save other young lives is morally
suspect." 1 9 While elective abortion creates ethical and moral dilemmas,
the possibility of relieving suffering and saving lives cannot be ignored.
Many of the ethical issues, if properly regulated, can be resolved. The
technology generated by the use of fetal tissue can offer hope and relief
to several million Americans every year.
JACQUELYN F. SEDLAK
189Note, Fetal Tissue Harvesting: Should Courts be the Final Arbiter?, 23 GONZ.
L. REV. 621, 623 (1987-88).
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